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ASSUMPTIONS OF LEGITIMACY: AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION
HOLLIN K. DICKERSON'

I.

INTRODUCTION

In his 2000 Millennium Declaration, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan
stated that the United Nations is "the only global institution with the legitimacy
and scope that derive from universal membership, and a mandate that encompasses
development, security and human rights as well as the environment. In this sense,
2
the United Nations is unique in world affairs." In the same address, Annan also
emphasized that "[w]eak states are one of the main impediments to effective
3
governance today, at national and international levels alike." Indeed, the postCold War phenomenon of an increasingly active United Nations portrays the
Organization as one both willing and able to act upon its Charter-endowed powers
of securing international peace and security to provide such governance, even if
doing so involves the administration of an independent territory.
The role that international organizations, and in particular the United Nations,
play in response to the problem of "weak states" is the very subject of international
territorial administration (ITA). Since the colonial era, the administration of
4
territory by outside actors has become a well-established practice. The first
instance, however, of internationalterritorial administration was the League of5
Nations' partial governance of the Free City of Danzig after World War 1.
Subsequent missions have included the League's administration of the Saar
territory and Leticia; United Nations operations in places such as the Congo, West
Irian, Cambodia, Somalia, Eastern Slavonia and, most recently, Kosovo and East
Timor; the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia; and the European
Union (EU) in Mostar.6 These projects stand in contrast to other instances of
1. J.D. 2005, The University of Texas School of Law. I would like to thank Sarah Cleveland,
Karen Engle, and Ralph Wilde for their helpful comments and Steven Ratner and David Hutchinson for
their continued support. This paper was first presented at Yale Law School as part of the Yale Journal
of InternationalLaw's 2005 Young Scholars Conference, and more recently at the American Society of
International Law's 2006 Annual Meeting.
2. The Secretary-General, We the Peoples: The Role of the UnitedNations in the 21st Century, at
49, U.N. Doc. A/54/2000 (2000) [hereinafter Millennium Declaration].
3. Id. at 7.
4. Ralph Wilde, TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 10 (2004)
[hereinafter WILDE, ADMINISTRATION] (manuscript on file with author).

5. Ralph Wilde, Representing International Territorial Administration: A Critique of Some
Approaches, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 71, 76 (2004). [hereinafter Wilde, Critique].
6. See WILDE, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 29, for a chart illustrating the dates of each

administration, its location, the administering actor, and the type of governance.
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foreign territorial administration that involve individual states as the administrative
actors (as seen during the age of colonialism and under both the Mandate and
Trusteeship systems). While ITA has been ongoing for decades at the level of both
plenary and partial administration, some have taken to calling the post-Cold War
missions as exceptional in the practice's overall history. This in turn has raised
concerns by some as to whether or not this practice has given rise to a new form
colonialism, albeit one conducted by international organizations in lieu of states.8
Others, however, offer these operations as examples of international liberalism at
its best.
Commentators often differentiate administration projects by the identity of the
actor conducting the operations. Some have remarked that ITA projects are "so
exceptionally difficult and politically sensitive that only a body with broad
international legitimacy stands a chance of success." 9 The demise of colonialism
and the subsequent rise of international organizations (1Os) have contributed to the
development of an assumption that international organizations are somehow
inherently more legitimate for undertaking territorial administration than are
individual states.' 0 The result is that states and international organizations have
been placed at opposite ends of a legitimacy continuum, whereby states are
associated with imposed rule and self-interested motives-thereby making them
illegitimate-and international organizations are viewed as benevolent, selfless,
and thus, legitimate.''
7. See, e.g., Michael J. Matheson, United Nations Governance of Postconflict Societies, 95 AM.
J. INT'L L. 76 (2001) (noting that the role of the United Nations in governing postconflict societies has

"substantially expanded"). However, Matheson is incorrect that this somehow constitutes a
new
practice by international organizations; for example, the United Nations took over full governance of
the Congo following the exit of Belgium as a colonial power in order to handle the resulting power
vacuum in the 1960's. See, e.g. PAUL F. DIEHL, INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING 50 (1994). Similarly,

the League of Nations was present in the Saar territory for some fifteen years before handing over final
sovereignty to Germany. During that time, it was involved in plenary administration. Ralph Wilde,
From Danzig to East Timor andBeyond The Role of InternationalTerritorialAdministration, 95 AM.
J. INT'L L. 583, 589-90 (2001) [hereinafter Wilde, From Danzig]. See also STEVEN R. RATNER, THE
NEW UN PEACEKEEPING: BUILDING PEACE IN LANDS OF CONFLICT AFTER THE COLD WAR 16-17

(1996).
8. Ruth E. Gordon, Some Legal Problems with Trusteeship, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 301, 345-46
(1995) (noting legal and political difficulties in reinstating a trusteeship model); Jacob S. Kreilkamp,
Junior Fellow's Note, U.N. Postconflict Reconstruction, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 619, 621 (2003)
(portraying the United Nations as engaging in a form of neocolonialism); Joel C. Beauvais, Note,
Benevolent Despotism: A Critiqueof U.N. State-Building in East Timor, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
1101, 1177-78 (2001) (arguing foe' increased local participation during transitional governance); Kristen
Boon, Legislative Reform in Post-Conflict Zones: Jus Post Bellum and the Contemporary Occupant's
Law-Making Powers, 50 MCGILL L.J. 285 (2005) (examining jus post bellum in light of the United
Nations' plenary assumption of legislative activities in East Timor and Kosovo).
9. Kirsti Samuels & Sebastian von Einsiedel, The Future of UN State-Building: Strategic and
OperationalChallenges and the Legacy of Iraq 12, International Peace Academy, Nov. 2003 available
at http://www.ipacademy.org/PDF-Reports/FUTURE OFUNSTATEBUILDING.pdf.
10. INIS L. CLAUDE, STATES AND THE GLOBAL SYSTEM: POLITICS, LAW AND ORGANIZATION 148
(1988).
11.

WILDE, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 263.

See also Steven

R. Ratner, Foreign

Occupation and International TerritorialAdministration: The Challenges of Convergence, 16 EUR. J.
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I argue that this normative bifurcation is oversimplified and masks very real
concerns that do exist regarding the legitimacy of international organizations to
carry out territorial administration, while at the same time highlighting preexisting
tensions within international law as a whole. In the end, by presenting states and
lOs as polar opposites with respect to territorial administration, the formulation
merely legitimizes activities undertaken by lOs that are considered illegitimate
when done by states.12 A recent example of the blurring that can occur in
distinguishing states from lOs has been seen in the C6te d'Ivoire. The U.N.'s
mission there (UNOCI) stated that the mandate of the C6te d'Ivoire National
Assembly should not be extended. Local residents saw the statement as "an affront
to Ivorian sovereignty," and engaged in violent protests demanding the United
13
As one protestor put it, "[w]e want the complete
Nations leave the country.
go home until the U.N. and France leave my
won't
I
liberation of Ivory Coast.
4
country.'
This article begins where previous discussions of ITA have left off by
examining whether or not legitimacy can be assumed on behalf of international
organizations as an administrative actor. In doing so, it explores the legitimacy of
1Os as administrative actors with respect to some of the characteristics that
scholars, nations, and local populations most commonly focus upon when
questioning an outside actor's validity to assume territorial control. Three aspects
of legitimacy will be discussed: first, the legal authority of international
organizations to conduct territorial administration; second, the accountability of
lOs within the context of ITA; and third, relevant factors related to certain
personality traits of international organizations, specifically their reputations for
selflessness and impartiality. By attempting to break ITA legitimacy down into
some of its primary components, my hope is that a more honest and principled
approach to future administration mandates may be realized that capitalizes on the
strengths of lOs while at the same time consciously compensating for their
weaknesses. This article does not seek to answer the question of whether any given
ITA project was or was not legitimate and does not attempt to answer whether, in
the end, international organizations themselves are wholly legitimate or
illegitimate. Instead, by creating a framework for assessing the legitimacy of lOs
to carry out the specific task of territorial administration, future ITA mandates can
be drafted that take into account a wider variety of players, processes, and
considerations than before. This, in turn, will help international organizations-and
particularly the United Nations in this era of reform-to start asking themselves

INT'L L.

695, 696 (2005).

as territorial
WILDE, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 262-63; (quoting Wilde "[j]ust
administration by foreign states was presented as essentially unjust in the era of decolonization, so this
12.

activity performed by international organizations is sometimes considered essentially legitimate

because it is conducted by international organizations. At the very least, the presumption is reversed;
what was presumed to be illegitimate is now presumed to be legitimate.").
13. Lydia Polgreen, Ivorian Leader Urges Youths to End Anti-U.N. Protests, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20,
2006, at A8.
14. Id.(emphasis added).
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the right questions with respect to these missions by examining them through a
more nuanced approach.
Part II of this article defines ITA by depicting its usages in response to socalled sovereignty and governance problems, which will be defined below. Part III
examines the historical basis for the state/IO distinction by briefly tracing the
evolution of territorial administration through colonialism, the League of Nations,
the early activities of the United Nations, and up to the current post-Cold War
setting. Part IV then analyzes an ITA actor's legitimacy through the three separate
lenses of legal authority, accountability, and reputation. Lastly, Part V concludes
by showing that while there are reasons to doubt that international organizations
are the best administration actor, by acknowledging the gaps that currently exist,
efforts can now be made to bridge them.
II.

AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION

ITA is a subset of the larger activity of foreign territorial administration. At a
basic level, foreign territorial administration can be thought of as local governance
of a territory (whether it be a state, nonstate, or substate unit) conducted by an
outside actor. 15 According to Ralph Wilde, the move from individual state
administration under colonialism to administration by international organizations
following World War I constitutes a distinct practice, both in terms of the role
performed by international organizations as well as their very identity as
international-as opposed to local-actors.' 6 Beginning with the League of
Nations' administration of the Free City of Danzig, ITA has been used in response
to essentially two types of operations, what Wilde terms sovereignty problems and
governance problems. 17 Depending on which type of situation is at issue, an 1O's
legitimacy for undertaking a particular ITA project will be affected.
Sovereignty problems concern the identity of who is in control and the basis
upon which that control is exercised. When ITA is used to manage a sovereignty
problem, it seeks to answer a larger question regarding the status of a territory.' 8 In
such situations, IOs are brought in to administer because they are "seen as 'neutral'
as compared with the local actors to whom the sovereignty problem relates."' 9
Thus, the League of Nations took control of the Saar region following World War I
because it was contested territory between France and Germany. 20 Similarly in
Leticia, the League responded when a group of Peruvians invaded and occupied

15. WILDE, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 17; see Wilde, From Danzig, supra note 7, at 585
(explaining that administrations can be partial (concerned only with certain matters) or plenary
(exercising full governmental powers)).
16. WILDE, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 18, 33-84 (thoroughly discussing the meaning of
"international organization").
17. Id.at 164.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. The Versailles Treaty, arts. 45, 49, June 28, 1919, Consol. T.S. 188 [hereinafter Versailles
Treaty].
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the Colombian town-the League exercised control for a one-year period in order
to serve as a neutral buffer before turning administrative control back over to
Colombia. 21The United Nations played the same role with respect to West Irian in
period before
the 1960s by conducting plenary administration for a seven-month
22
Indonesia.
to
Netherlands
the
from
authority
the transfer of
The second type of ITA operations, those involving governance problems,
occur when the basis for outside involvement is the manner of governance being
23
exercised in a territory, rather than the identity of the actor in control. The recent
U.N. operations in Kosovo (United Nations Mission in Kosovo, or UNMIK) and
East Timor (United Nations. Transitional Assistance in East Timor, or UNTAET)
24
are both representative of this type of administration. In Kosovo, UNMIK was
established following mass human rights violations by Serb leaders against
Kosovar Albanians; the goal of the mission was to effect a change in the existing
local governance (the Serbs), not to answer a question of who that governance
was. 25 In East Timor, because the local people were not deemed to be ready or
capable of assuming the responsibilities of self-governance themselves at the time
of independence, UNTAET actively engaged in plenary governance in East Timor
for a period of three years.26
Aside from the sovereignty- and governance-problem model, another manner
in which ITA can be viewed is as a mechanism for promoting self-determination
entitlements. According to Wilde, by looking at ITA from the perspective of self27
determination, the focus shifts away from the territory itself and onto the people.
1Os promote the right to self-determination by assisting in referenda (as in the Saar
and West Irian) or by promoting a particular territorial outcome based on an
25
existing right to either internal or external self-determination (as in Kosovo).
21. Wilde, From Danzig, supra note 7, at 587; see id at 588 ("For Colombia, it was a staging post
in between control by the Peruvian irregulars and control by Colombian authorities. For Peru, however,
it ensured that the territory would not be transferred to Colombia until the wider border dispute between
the two countries was resolved.").
22. The Netherlands' claim for control had failed to garner the necessary two-thirds support
needed in the General Assembly. Acting to save itself from embarrassment, the Netherlands said it was
for the local population to decide, and the interim period of administration under UNTEA (U.N.
Temporary Executive Authority) again provided a convenient buffer. Id.at 588; John Saltford, United
Nations Involvement with the Act of Self-Determination in West Irian (Indonesian West New Guinea)
1968 to 1969, at 1,2, available at http://www.fpcn-global.org/downloads/act-of-free-choice-papua/un-

papua- 1968-69.pdf.
23. Wilde, From Danzig, supra note 7, at 592.
24. Idat 593.

25. Kosovo presents a unique situation in that the final status of the territory has not yet been
determined. In the preceding examples of Leticia and West Irian, the underlying issue of who would
ultimately govern had already been resolved, and an international organization merely provided interim
administration. See WILDE, ADMINISTRATION, supranote 4, at 177.
26. Wilde, From Danzig, supra note 7, at 600. UNTAET"s mandate under Resolution 1272
included providing security and maintaining law and order, in the development of civil and social
services, and supporting East Timor's capacity for self-government. See S.C. Res. 1272, at 2, 2, U.N.
h
SCOR, 54' Sess., 4057th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (Oct. 25, 1999).
27. WILDE, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 199.
28. Id. at 201. In West Irian, Indonesia received assistance from the U.N. representative to carry
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Arising out of a rejection of the colonial approach, the right to self-determination
continues to form much of the background to modem-day international
administration prerogatives.
Thus, territorial administration as conducted by international organizations is
characterized by certain activities and by certain purposes. 29 It is important to
differentiate ITA from peacekeeping, which is commonly (though variously)
defined as the deployment of military intervention forces designed to prevent
existing disputes from reemerging.3 ° ITA more closely fits with the idea of
postconflict peacebuilding as endorsed by former U.N. Secretary-General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali in his An Agenda for Peace.31 According to Boutros-Ghali,
peacebuilding includes efforts to advance economic and social development while
fostering the type of confidence in local institutions that is fundamental for a
lasting peace.32
The basic connection between all administration projects, whether conducted
by states (foreign territorial administration) or by international organizations
(ITA), is that in each case local actors are displaced by an outside administration.
Who precisely is conducting the administration and that actor's legitimacy in doing
so is the focus of the remainder of this article.
III.

THE BASES FOR LEGITIMACY ASSUMPTIONS

The story of ITA is fundamentally one of sovereignty 33 and selfdetermination. A chronological look at the history of foreign territorial
administration reveals a pattern closely aligned with prevailing notions of state
out the plebiscite. RATNER, supra note 7, at I11.
29. See WILDE, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 191-227 (discussing how ITA implements
international law in the areas of international dispute settlement and prevention; resolution of certain
areas of public policy, such as territorial status outcomes and liberal governance; and the promotion of
international peace and security).
30. Charles W. Kegley, Jr., Thinking Ethically about Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, in
PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEMAKING 17, 18 (Tom Woodhouse et al. eds., 1998); Interview with Sir Brian
Urquhart, Former Undersecretary General of the U.N., in Berkeley, Cal. (Mar. 19, 1996),
http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/UN/Urquhart/urquhart6.htm
(last visited Sept. 26, 2004) [hereinafter
Urquhart Interview].
31. The Secretary-General, Agenda for Peace Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemakingand Peacekeeping, para. 55, 56, delivered to the Security Council and the General Assembly, U.N. Doc.
A/47/277, S/241 11 (June 17, 1992), http://www.un.orgADocs/SG/agpeace.html [hereinafter Agenda for
Peace].
32. See id. at para. 5; Many commentators continue to use the language of peacekeeping when
describing ITA without carefully distinguishing between the two. See, e.g., RATNER, supra note 7, at
40-41; Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Legal Basis of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations, 43
VA. J. INT'L L. 485 (2003) (discussing ITA projects, including the U.N. Operations in the Congo
(ONUC) and UNTAET, under the mantle of peacekeeping).
33. The use of this term is not without its problems. Ian Brownlie has noted its frequent invocation
by statesmen acting pursuant to political motivations. In addition, he finds that its usage by lawyers
tends to obscure complex considerations of "the rights, duties, powers, liberties, and immunities of
states." IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 106 (Oxford Univ. Press 2003)
(1973); However, Brownlie also finds that over time a consistency of use has developed, such that
"[t]he normal complement of state rights, the typical case of legal competence, is described commonly
as 'sovereignty."' Id. It is this latter meaning that I intend here.
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responsibility vis-A-vis international law at given points in history. As pure
positivism gradually declined in influence and a growing recognition of selfdetermination entitlements came into existence, a belief in international
organizations as a viable alternative to imposed colonial regimes took hold. The
following historical discussion sets forth the normative bases upon which foreign
territorial administration as conducted by individual states and as conducted by
international organizations are distinguished.
A. Colonialism
"Colonies, by definition, lack sovereignty." 34 Today, scholars cite to
economic, strategic, religious, and psychological factors as the motivations behind
colonialism. 35 Antony Anghie notes that the confrontation that occurred between
the European nations and their colonies was not seen as one between sovereign
nations, but rather as between sovereign European nations and uncivilized ones
lacking in sovereignty. 36 For example, Jules Ferry, prime minister of France during
the 1880s, once emphasized that "the superior races have37 a right because they have
a duty. They have a duty to civilize the inferior races....
Based upon such sentiments, Anghie persuasively argues that international
law legitimized such conquests and that therefore, the very notion of sovereignty
was established and shaped through the practice of colonialism. 38 Therefore, prior
to World War I, the world was essentially divided into the civilized and the
uncivilized, with only the civilized possessing full sovereignty. 39 Because colonies
were not considered politically independent, individual states were able to use their
superior military and economic power to control individual territories and impose
plenary administration upon them. 40 At the same time, the colonial powers were
themselves held unaccountable for abuses perpetuated during their time in power.41
The imposition of forced foreign rule, the presence of self-interested motives, and
the overall lack of accountability are among the characteristics that international
territorial administration seeks to overcome.

34. Antony Anghie, Colonialism and the Birth of International Institutions: Sovereignty,
Economy, and the Mandate System of the League of Nations, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 513, 513

(2002) [hereinafter Anghie, Colonialism].
35. Ruth Gordon, Saving Failed States: Sometimes a Neocolonialist Notion, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L.

& POL'Y 903, 932-33 (1997).
36. Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth Century
International Law, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1,3 (1999) [hereinafter Anghie, Peripheries].

37. Jules Franqois Camille Ferry, Speech Before the French Chamber of Deputies (Mar. 28, 1884)
in
DISCOURS

ET

OPINIONS

DE

JULES

FERRY

(Paul

Robiquet

ed.,

1987),

available

at

http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1884ferry.html.
38. Aghie, Peripheries, supra note 36, at 6.
39. Id. at 3.
40. Gordon, supra note 8, at 339-340.
41. See Giselle Reid, The Legacy of Colonialism: A Hindrance to Self-Determination, 10 ToURO

INT'L L. REv. 277, 286-90 (2000) (discussing the more harmful aspects of colonial regimes).
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B. The League of Nations
The establishment of the League of Nations following World War I reflected
a new-found internationalist spirit among the world community. 42 The post-World
War I period witnessed a dramatic rethinking in the principles of sovereignty and
collective security, leading to the creation of a new international body devoted to
the prevention of international conflict. 43 The League of Nations challenged the
prevailing positivist model of international law by focusing on international
cooperation, something that necessarily entailed a diminution in state sovereignty
in a world where working together rather than fighting against became the new
norm. 44 In addition, President Wilson's endorsement of a right to selfdetermination exerted a powerful influence over postwar thinking, which in turn
influenced the manner in which the post-colonial territories were treated, both
legally and politically. 45 The League's response to anticolonial sentiment and the
presence of newly independent territories as a result of the post-World War I
decolonization movement was the Mandates system, which placed territories "not
' 46
yet able to stand by themselves" under the "tutelage" of "advanced nations.
Anghie states that the Mandate system "attempted to do nothing less than to
promote self-government and, in certain cases, to integrate previously colonized
and dependent peoples into the international system as sovereign, independent
nation-states.4 7 This was intended to be in juxtaposition to the colonial vision that
had excluded non-European people (i.e., those living under colonial regimes) from
the international system.48 The Mandates system, although still administered by
individual states, differed from colonialism in at least one important respect-the
authority for the Mandates issued forth from the League Covenant rather than from
coercion as exercised by individual states.49

42. DIEHL, supra note 7, at 15.
43. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT pmbl.

44. See id arts. 10, 11; HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CONTEXT 93-94 (2004).

45. STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 44, at 93.
Article 22 embodied two sets of
46. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22, paras. 1, 2;
obligations: substantive ones to help the former colonies "stand alone" and procedural ones that
required nations to submit annual reports to a permanent League Commission acting in a supervisory
role. Id.; While the Mandate system did confer equivalent legal status upon the administered territories
and charged the League with supervising the undertakings of the administering nations, in practice
Article 22 provided for three different levels of administration according to the degree of independence
a territory had thus far attained. Gordon, supra note 8, at 340.; "A" Mandates were those whose
"existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of
administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory..."; "B" Mandates required administration in a
way that would guarantee certain fundamental rights, prohibit the slave trade, and secure equal
economic opportunities; and "C" Mandates were to be administered "under the laws of the Mandatory
LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22.
as integral portions of its territory ....
47. Anghie, Colonialism,supra note 34, at 515.
48. See id. at 516.
49. Edward Marks, Commentary, Transitional Governance:A Return to the Trusteeship System?,
Feb.
1999,
at 4,
Hill,
N.C.)
Dipl., Chapel
(Am.
AM.
DIPL. COMMENTARY
http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/AD-Issues/amdipl-10/marks2.html.
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The League marked an important shift in the purpose of territorial
administration by attempting to provide for the eventual independence of the
Mandates and, during the entire period of its existence, the League itself only
conducted three ITA projects-the Free City of Danzig, the Saar, and Leticia. 50
Still, the choice for an international organization as the administering body
remained the exception, and individual state administration the rule.
C. The United Nations
The successor to the League, the United Nations, inherited the League's focus
on collective security and faith in international organizations. With respect to
territorial administration, the U.N. Charter marked another evolution in the concept
of sovereignty, as primarily seen in Article l's focus on the maintenance of
international peace and security, equality among nations, and its enshrinement of
the principle of self-determination. 51 The dual goals of promoting selfdetermination and collectively ensuring international peace and security have
together provided the bases for U.N. ITA projects.
With respect to the colonies, the Charter sought to finish what the League had
started: ending colonialism's final vestiges by making the former colonies full
members of the international community. 52 The long-term goal of the Charter's
Non-Self-Governing Territories and the Trusteeship Council was to lead these
territories to the point where they could freely choose for themselves their own
political status, which would presumably be independence. 3 The Charter's
commitment to self-determination fundamentally rejected individual state
administration altogether, and the effect was that all such existing projects were
made contingent upon the expressed will of the local populations as a
manifestation of a self-determination entitlement.5 4 Wilde points out the
incongruity in the decolonization agenda:
Because of the historical denial of self-administration, a people were
entitled to decide how their internal administrative arrangements, and
external status, were to operate in the future. However, this legacy of

external administration also meant that the local population was not
in a position to carry out the process through which its entitlement
would be realized.... The use of ITA both to implement the
obligations of the administering authority, and enable the 'act of selfdetermination' is, then, ultimately consistent with the self-

determination agenda of preventing a repeat of the colonial activity in

50. Wilde, From Danzig, supranote 7, at 586.
51. U.N. CHARTER art. 1,para. 1,2, 4.
52. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 73-85, available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter;Chapter XIII
created the Trusteeship Council to oversee the trust territories by considering reports submitted by the
administering authority, accepting petitions, and conducting periodic visits at times agreed upon with
at
1.,
available
87,
para.
Id.
art
authority.
the
administering
http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapt13.htm.
53. Gordon, supra note 8, at 319.
54. WILDE, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 247-48.
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the future. Ironically involving a form of this activity, it was
necessary to bring the activity to a permanent end.
ITA continued during the post-World War II decolonization period while
administration projects conducted by states were phased out and eventually
discarded altogether.5 6 Throughout the Mandate and Trusteeship systems,
individual state administration and ITA existed side-by-side; 57 after World War I,
the desire of victorious states to assume control prevailed over League
administration, and the continuation of this model in the United Nations provided a
strong precedent for state administration.5 s Over time, however, the illegitimacy
that came to be associated with individual state administration in the wake of
colonialism and the corresponding rise of self-determination entitlements created
the normative space necessary for international organizations to assume these
functions.59
D. Post-Cold War
Today's critics of international organizations have been prompted in part by
the United Nations' increased use of Charter operations in the post-Cold War
environment. In his 1992 An Agenda for Peace, then-Secretary-General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali set forth an expansive vision of a newly activated United Nations
that would play a leading role in "post-conflict peace-building. ' 60 Boutros-Ghali
emphasized the importance of respecting the sovereignty of each state while
simultaneously encouraging the Security Council to use the full range of Charter
provisions for ensuring international peace and security. 61 In March 1993, for the
first time, the Security Council declared that a purely internal civil war was a threat
to international peace and security and, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,
established the United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM II).62 UNOSOM
1I's mandate included not only the unprecedented request for humanitarian
assistance from U.N. organs, but also the administrative goals of reestablishing
national and regional governmental institutions and conducting civil affairs
throughout the entire country.63

Those who view ITA in generational terms commonly see the more recent
U.N. operations in places such as Cambodia, Somalia, Kosovo, and East Timor as

55. Id. at 250-51.
56. Id. at 251.
57. See Wilde, From Danzig, supra note 7, at 603.
58. See id. at 604.
59. See WILDE, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 263.
60. An Agenda for Peace,supra note 31, para. 5.
61. See id. at para. 35.
62. S.C. Res. 814, U.N. Doc. S/RES/814 (Mar. 26, 1993).
63. See id. at para. 4(a), (c), (g); More recently, Secretary-General Annan's 2005 report pursuant
to the recommendations of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change stated that "the
United Nations now has more missions on the ground than ever before." The Secretary-General, In
Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rightsfor All, para. 111,
delivered to the
GeneralAssembly, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005) [hereinafter In Larger Freedom]..
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marking a new high point of U.N. activity. 64 This, in turn, has led to accusations
that the United Nations is usurping the power of its Member States, becoming too
involved in matters of domestic concern, and, in short, taking over a neocolonialist
role in the world. 65 Nevertheless, the modem-day choice of international
organizations as the actors conducting territorial administration seems to have
largely displaced foreign state administration as "the device of choice. 66
IV. THE LEGITIMACY INQUIRY

Up until now, this article has set forth the historical basis for the state/IO
divide with respect to territorial administration actors by briefly tracing the
chronological evolution of concepts such as sovereignty, self-determination, and
decolonization. The question remains, however, whether in light of the basis for
the distinction, legitimacy on the part of international organizations can be
assumed when it comes to ITA.
Of late, much scholarly discussion has revolved around the legitimacy of
international organizations, in particular the United Nations. 67 Yet legitimacy
itself is an intangible concept with significant political, legal, historical, and social
dimensions. One definition describes legitimacy as "the process through which
political differentiation-the fact there are people who govern and others who are
governed-is justified., 68 David Caron points out that legitimacy is based on
"subjective conclusions, perhaps based on unarticulated notions about what is fair
and just, or perhaps on a conscious utilitarian assessment of what the process
means for oneself., 69 Jean-Marc Coicaud is one commentator who has been
particularly critical of U.N. legitimacy. He believes, however, that ultimately, the
concept of legitimacy on the international level is still in its infancy because the
process of true global integration has only just begun.7 °
Since the end of World War I, the overwhelming majority of territorial
administration projects have been conducted by either the League of Nations or the
United Nations.71 Whereas formerly, international organizations were seen as more
or less beholden to their Member States, many believe that today's lOs are seeking
64. See, e.g., Matheson, supra note 7, at 76; See Simon Chesterman, You, the People: The United
Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building 2, International Peace Academy, Nov. 2003
available at http://www.ipacademy.org/PDFReports/YOUTHEPEOPLE2.pdf.
65. Veijo Heiskanen, THE LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 8 (Jean-Marc
Coicaud & Veijo Heiskanen eds., 2001); see Krcilkamp, supra note 8, at 667.
66. Wilde, From Danzig, supra note 7, at 605.
67. See generally The Secretary-General, A More Secure World. Our Shared Responsibility,
delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/59/565, (Dec. 2, 2004), available at
http://www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf [hereinafter High-Level Panel Report].
68. Jean-Marc Coicaud, International Democratic Culture and its Sources of Legitimacy: The
Case of Collective Security and Peacekeeping Operations in the 1990s, in THE LEGITIMACY OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 256, 259 (Jean-Marc Coicaud & Veijo Heiskanen eds., 2001).
69. David D. Caron, The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council, 87 AM. J.
INT'L L. 552, 557 (1993).

70. Coicaud, supra note 68, at 260.
71. See WILDE, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 29.
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to become independent actors in their own right, complete with their own agendas
and goals.72 An important related shift in international relations theory now
concentrates upon weaker states as a source of international problems, as opposed
to more traditional views that focused upon the larger, more powerful nations.73 As
mentioned, accusations that the United Nations is acting ultra vires when it comes
to operations like UNMIK and UNTAET are becoming more widespread today.74
In response, the United Nations has resisted "the equation of the post-colonial ITA
missions with the earlier state-conducted manifestations of foreign territorial
The need for this intentional distancing from the image of
administration....
colonialism raises questions as to whether the legitimacy of international
organizations truly can be assumed in today's political and legal environment.
This section begins by examining the legal authority for ITA and then turns to
an analysis of 10 accountability, followed by a discussion of certain aspects of an
10's identity as they relate to an 10's legitimacy to undertake territorial
administration. Despite an overlap in many areas, the overall framework serves as
a useful basis upon which legitimacy can be mapped and analyzed within the
specific context of territorial administration.
A. LegalAuthority
The rejection of colonial rule stems in part from its forced imposition, and the
collective security system that served as a basis for the creation of both the League
and the United Nations implies precisely what was lacking under colonialismconsent. While it remains true that the League did not enjoy universal membership,
much of the belief underlying U.N. action is based on the premise that it serves as
an expression of international will that is itself properly reflective of the consent of
those involved.76 When examined in the context of ITA, the question becomes one
of whose consent matters: the Member States, the host state, or the local
population. Because ITA has largely grown out of a rejection of imposed colonial
rule, the existence of meaningful consent is necessary to transform what is
by individual states into legitimate
illegitimate administration when done
77
administration when conducted by IOs.
Gene Lyons has said that "[i]ntervention must be collective and subject to
72. Jan Klabbers, The Changing Image of International Organizations, in THE LEGITIMACY OF

221, 226 (Jean-Marc Coicaud & Veijo Heiskanen eds., 2001).
73. See CLAUDE, supra note 10, at 33; For example, Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner both
propose a model of U.N. conservatorship with respect to the problem of so-called failed states without
addressing why the U.N. is the ideal actor chosen for this. See Gerald B. Helman & Steven R. Ratner,
Saving FailedStates, 89 FOREIGN POL'Y 3, 12-18 (1993).
74. See generally Symposium, The Security Council: Its Authority and Legitimacy, 87 AM. Soc'Y
INT'L L. PROC. 300 (1993); How a society feels about such "laudable hyper-activity" largely depends on
its political realist versus internationalist orientation. Kegley, supra note 30, at 18.
75. WILDE, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 255.
76. See Michael Ottolenghi, The Stars and Stripes in Al-Fardos Square: The Implicationsfor the
InternationalLaw of Belligerent Occupation,72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2177, 2194 (2004) (describing three
models of U.N. governance: the Trusteeship system, Chapter VII operations, and a consent-based model
dependent upon the consent of the parties involved).
77. WILDE, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 262-63.
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,
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broadly accepted rules through which the international community, through the
UN or other recognized means, authorizes intervention in the common cause...
,78 In terms of legality, modern (i.e. post-Cold War) ITA projects are authorized
by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter.7 9 In terms of
relevant Charter provisions, Article 24 gives the Council the primary responsibility
for ensuring international peace and security8" and, under Article 39, the Council is
charged with determining the existence of any threat to the peace. 81 Thus, when
acting pursuant to Chapter VII to authorize an ITA project, it must be the case that
the Security Council has deemed the situation---either between two states or within
a single one-to pose such a threat.
Caron argues that perceptions of 10 legitimacy principally arise in "that space
between the promises of the preamble to the charter of the organization and the
realities of the compromises in the text that follows, a space where there is
discretion regarding the use of authority." 82 He notes that too great a discrepancy
between the ideals of an organization and its eventual actions is one source of
illegitimacy. 83 Indeed, the Agenda for Peace has today become largely discredited
for its overreaching idealism concerning the expansive manner in which the
Charter should be read to allow for increased U.N. involvement in individual
states.84 In Kosovo and East Timor, for example, the Security Council invoked
Article 41, concerning nonmilitary means of enforcing international peace and
security (and listing as examples interruption of the means of communication and
85
severance of diplomatic relations), to authorize plenary territorial administration.
Related to the ultra vires claims, some argue that internal Charter limits
restrict the use of territorial administration, pointing specifically to Article 2(7)'s
prohibition on intervention in matters that are within the domestic jurisdiction of a
state.86 The counterargument holds that the erosion of sovereignty since World
War II makes the limits imposed by Article 2(7) largely irrelevant and that today,
there could exist an emerging "legitimate 'right' to intervene in the domestic
87
affairs of member states in the name of community norms, values, or interests[.]
78. Gene M. Lyons, The United Nations, International Security, and the National Interest, in
PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEMAKING 75 (Tom Woodhouse et al. eds., 1998).
79. U.N. Charter arts. 39-42.
80. Id. art. 24.
81. Id. art. 39.
82. Caron, supra note 69, at 560.
83. Id.
84. WILDE, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 209. One example of such an expansive reading is
the Somalia intervention. See discussion supra Part III.D.
85. U.N. Charter art. 41; see Ottolenghi, supra note 76, at 2197.
86. U.N. Charter art. 2, para 7; The more legalistic viewpoints of Jonathan Chamey and Bruno
Simma in the context of Kosovo are set forth in A. Mark Weisburd's, International Law and the
Problem of Evil, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 225, 238 (2001); See also Ratner & Helman, supra note
73, at 9; Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1
(1999); MANFRED NOWAK, INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS REGIME 34
(2003).
87. Gene M. Lyons & Michael Mastanduno, Introduction: International Itervention, State
Sovereignty, and the Future of InternationalSociety, in BEYOND WESTPHALIA? STATE SOVEREIGNTY
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Therefore, underlying the legal authority of ITA as a function of consent is a more
88
elemental debate as to whether ITA is ever appropriate under the U.N. Charter.
1. Member State Consent
As Steven Ratner has stated,
"[t]o avoid the stigma of being seen as occupiers, [international
organizations] have developed their own legal and political coping
mechanisms. They have, I believe, assumed that the approval of
these missions by the organization's competent organs insulates them
from the problems of occupiers and have refused to apply the term to
these missions." 89
With regard to Member State consent, the decision-making process in the
Security Council has also been the source of much critique, primarily due to the
fact that its membership is not democratically elected and is dominated by a few
powerful states. 90 In order for a resolution to pass, an affirmative vote of nine
Members is needed, with all permanent members concurring. 9' Any resolution
passed by the Security Council is legally binding on all Member States and
prevails over any other law.92 Whether or not the Security Council serves as an
accurate proxy of international will and the problems inherent in its structure will
be discussed in Part C below, but suffice it to say here that when the Council
authorizes an ITA mandate, it provides the necessary legal authority for the
Organization to administer a territory.
Much of the rationale for seeking Member State consent grows out of a theory
of international public power that requires that the conditions of governance must
93
be acceptable both to those exercising the power as well as those affected by it.
The Security Council purports to give rise to an implied international consent for
the projects it authorizes; in other words, collective security "implies action under
However, the voting results for
authority of the world community as a whole....
past ITA missions reveal a somewhat lopsided record, which tends to lend these
3 (1995).
88. I do not attempt to resolve that debate here, but for a good discussion on the controversies
underlying Charter authority for "old" and "new" peacekeeping (a definitional approach that
encompasses ITA operations) see RATNER, supra note 7, at 56-61.
89. Ratner, supra note 7, at 697.
90. See High-Level Panel Report, supra note 67, para. 248 ("[i]ncreasing both the effectiveness
and the credibility of the Security Council] requires greater involvement in Security Council decisionmaking by those who contribute most; greater contributions from those with special decision-making
authority; and... a firm consensus on the nature of today's threats..
91. U.N. Charter art. 27.
92. Id. art. 25.
93. Philip Allot, Intergovernmental Societies and the Idea of Constitutionalism, in THE
LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 70 (Jean-Marc Coicaud & Veijo Heiskanen eds.,
2001).
94. QUINCY WRIGHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE UNITED NATIONS 15 (1960); It should be
noted that because Chapter VII resolutions are legally binding under the Charter, by virtue of having
ratified the Charter a state therefore consents to be bound by determinations of the Security Council.
U.N. Charter art. 103.
AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION

2006

ASSUMPTIONS OF LEGITIMACY

resolutions less authoritative weight than a unanimous, unambiguous voice
would. 95 Caron points out that the potential for a veto by any one of the permanent
members has a detrimental effect on the sense of participatory democracy that is
96
meant to give authority to Security Council resolutions. From the realist
perspective of international relations theory, it is not entirely clear that the legal
authority that emanates from the Security Council reflects the United Nations'
universal membership and overall "collectiveness" by taking into account a
97
broader range of states with no effectual voice in the Council's decision making.
This in turn raises questions as to the true existence of Member State consent for
U.N.-authorized ITA projects.
2. Host-State Consent
Turning to host-state consent, Lyon uses the Security Council to invoke the
colonial image of the strong overbearing the weak by stating that "[i]ntervention...
cannot be an extension of the practice of strong states intervening into the domestic
affairs of the weak on their own initiative in terms of their own assessment of what
98
international security requires., Because Article 2(4) of the Charter expressly
prohibits the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state, in order to make military interventions legal the consent of the host
99
state has traditionally been required for peacekeeping operations. According to
David Wippman, "That [host-state] consent may validate an otherwise wrongful
' 00
It is less clear,
military intervention.., is a generally accepted principle."
however, the degree to which this principle extends to ITA, where the intervention
is not military action but rather civilian administration. Article 2(7) does not
contain a corresponding limitation to only uses of force, yet from the perspective
of those who argue for its irrelevancy, host-state consent is not necessary to
0
transform nonmilitary intervention from illegal to legal.' ' Others, however,
exercise of power
any
to
vital
continue to maintain that host-state consent remains
10 2
nature.
in
civilian
or
military
be
it
whether
under Chapter VII,
Problems of host-state consent may only be relevant in the context of the
aforementioned governance problems, where ITA is often conducted precisely to
95. See Caron, supra note 69, at 563; see Claude, supra note 10, at 154; see, e.g., S.C. Res 143,

U.N. Doc. S/RES/143 (July 14, 1960); S.C. Res. 435, U.N. Doc. S/RES/435 (Sept. 29, 1978); S.C. Res.

1244, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999). China abstained from ONUC's authorization, China and
Russia both abstained from UNTAG's authorization, and China and France abstained from UNMIK's
authorization.
96. See Caron, supranote 69, at 566.
97. See, e.g., Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty and Intervention, in BEYOND WESTPHALIA? STATE
(1995).
98. Lyons, supra note 78, at 75.
99. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; see Andreas Laursen, The Use of Force and (the State 0)
Necessity, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 485, 510 (2004) (referring to a statement by Oscar Schachter).
100. David Wippman, Military Intervention, Regional Organizations,and Host-State Consent, 7
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 209, 209 (1996) (emphasis added).
101. Lyons & Mastaduno, supra note 87, at 14.
102. Ratner, supra note 7, at 26 (finding that ITA operations "must start with the consent of the
parties to the conflict."); Orakhelashvili, supra note 32, at 518-19.
SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION 229

DENV. J. INT'L

L. &

POL'Y

VOL. 34:2

go against the wishes of the host state in order to effect a change in the local
government. In these situations, in place of host-state consent, there is, instead,
Security Council authorization. UNMIK in Kosovo was such a case.' 0 3 While
U.N. administration was provided for in the Peace Plan signed by the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (the FRY), the FRY was not considered to be a member of
the U.N. when Resolution 1244 was passed, thus negating the aforementioned
effects of any sort of implied consent via the operation of Chapter VII. 10 4 On the
other hand, the U.N. Operations in the Congo (ONUC) presents a classic case of
host-state consent with respect to a governance problem: following Belgium's
withdrawal, the fledgling Congolese government requested U.N. assistance to help
it maintain law and order and provide effective governance. 0 5 By contrast, in
Namibia the Security Council intended for UNTAG to engage in direct governance
yet, due to South Africa's resistance following complex peace negotiations, it only
performed election monitoring in the end, despite determinations by the
International Court of Justice and General Assembly that South Africa's continued
06
presence was illegal. 1

When, however, ITA has been conducted in response to sovereignty
problems, host-state consent has invariably been sought prior to the 10's presence.
For example, the League's presence in the Saar was included in the Versailles
Treaty, 107 both Indonesia and the Netherlands consented to the U.N.'s role in West
Irian, and Croatia and the Serb militias invited the U.N. to administer Eastern
Slavonia during the interim handover period.'0 8 A distinction must therefore be
made between governance problems that require changes of certain local
governmental actors and those that operate to assist a struggling state or to serve as
an interim buffer; the legal relevance of host-state consent in the former appears to
stand on weaker footing than in the latter. The substitution of Security Council
authorization in place of host-state consent is in and of itself problematic due to
flaws in the Council's decision-making processes and the composition of its
members. Nevertheless, when the attainment of host-state consent is possible, the
U.N. in practice seeks it, showing that such consent can continue to serve a
legitimizing function, even if only on a political or normative level.
3. Local Consent
Even if host-state consent has been present, additional concerns have arisen
with respect to whether or not the consent of those most affected by territorial
administration has been obtained. In terms of local consent, as discussed in Part II,
one way in which ITA projects can be conceived of is as promoting selfdetermination entitlements, and one of the primary mechanisms for achieving this
goal is through the use of local referenda that allow a population to decide the
103. See discussion infra Part II.
104. U.N. Doc. S/1999/649, para. 3, 5 (1999); Penelope Mathew et al., The Role of State Protection
in Refugee Analysis, 15 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 444,457 (2003).

105. Diehl, supra note 7, at 50.
106. S.C. Res. 629, U.N. Doc. S/RES/629 (Jan. 16, 1989); Ratner,supra note 7, at 118-21.
107. The Versailles Treaty, supranote 20, art. 16.
108. Wilde, From Danzig,supra note 7, at 588-89.
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future of their territory. The law of self-determination requires that the inhabitants
of a territory be able "freely to determine, without external interference, their
political status and to pursue their own economic, social, and cultural
development."' 0 9 Simon Chesterman seeks legitimacy for territorial administration
0
by looking to the consent of the local population." However, Chesterman also
explains that it would be inaccurate and counterproductive:
to assert that transitional administration depends upon the consent or
,ownership' of local populations. It is inaccurate because if genuine
local control were possible then a transitional administration would
not be necessary. It is counter-productive because insincere claims of
local ownership lead to frustration and suspicion on the part of local
actors.'

Wilde too looks to the consent of local populations. According to him, the
need for a popular consultation to determine the status of a territory has its roots in
the rejection of colonialism as an imposed regime not consented to by the local
population." 2 In its Western Sahara Advisory Opinion, the International Court of
Justice stated that in order for something to serve as an act of self-determination, it
l l3
requires "a free and genuine expression of the peoples of the Territory."" Ian
Brownlie notes that territorial administration by the U.N. is not inconsistent with
the view that the U.N. cannot have territorial sovereignty, and in conjunction
Wilde emphasizes the fact that the U.N. makes not claim to title over the areas it
administers."l 4 When ITA is conducted with respect to a territory (whether a state
or nonstate) that enjoys an external self-determination entitlement, Wilde argues
that such areas, by virtue of that entitlement, take on a distinct legal personality.'
In order to legitimize a territory's juridical status and give meaning to the concept
of self-determination as a human right, the consent of local populations is required
for ITA because "determinations of external status... are quintessentially public
decisions."' 16

109. Gordon, supra note 8, at 320-21.
110. See Chesterman, supra note 64, at 3; see WILDE, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 154
(arguing that a similar situation existed in 1975 in East Timor when two competing factions made
claims for statehood in the absence of a referendum involving the entire population).
l 11. Id. This was arguably the situation in 1975 when two competing factions made claims for
statehood in the absence of a referendum involving the entire population. See Wilde Administration,
supra note 4, at 154.
112. WILDE, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 139.
113. Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 32 (Oct. 16).
114. BROWNLIE, supra note 33, at 167 (noting that administrative powers rest legitimately on the
principle of necessary implication).
115. WILDE, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 136.
116. Id.at 140; The Canadian Supreme Court has famously distinguished the rights to external and
internal self-determination. A right to external self-determination exists when a people are prevented
from meaningfully exercising their right to self-determination within an existing state, thereby giving
rise to a potential right of secession. Internal self-determination, however, is defined by the Court as "a
people's pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural development within the framework of an
existing state." Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.R. 217.
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Both the League and the United Nations have played a significant role in
giving a voice to local populations,' 17 yet doubts have arisen as to the true validity
of at least some of these consultations. On the one hand, the plebiscite held in the
Saar under League auspices gave the people the option of union with France, union
with Germany, or continued League administration; the people's choice of
Germany reflected the outcome of a democratic process aimed at ensuring a thenemerging right to self-determination.' 18 In contrast to the Saar plebiscite, in West
Irian, Indonesia and the Netherlands reached an agreement to transfer control of
the territory to UNTEA (United Nations Temporary Executive Authority), and,
following the U.N.'s exit, a consultation took place to determine whether the
people wished to remain or sever ties with Indonesia." 9 The consultation was
largely viewed as corrupted and controlled by the local elite to ensure the resulting
decision to remain with Indonesia. The consultation was nonetheless endorsed by
the United Nations in the end. 20 The area was incorporated into Indonesia, and the
local people have continued to press for their full independence ever since. 12 1 In
East Timor, the autonomy proposal was rejected by 78.5% of the voters,
expressing the popular will for exercising self-determination in the form of
independence.' 2 2 However, only if the locals had read the May Agreement would
12 3
they know that a vote for independence was also a vote for U.N. administration.
Because the question was never properly put before the people, approval for
UNTAET cannot be inferred from the people's vote for full independence.
The legality of ITA missions as based upon the consent of relevant actors
rests on somewhat shaky grounds. While the universal membership of lOs gives
rise to the idea that there exists an identifiable international community that can
adequately express its will, the uneven distribution of power in the Security
Council raises concerns as to the effectiveness of implied international consent. In
some cases, the very fact of universal membership has worked against the United
Nations. For example, the choice for EU administration of Mostar under EUAM in
1994 can best be understood as a preference for a regional, rather than
international, organization that was more representative of the territory in
question. 12 4 In addition to this, going into nations without their prior consent runs
117. See David J. Scheffer, U.N. Engagement in Ethnic Conflicts, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
ETHNIC CONFLICT 156 (David Wippman ed., 1998) ("[T]he United Nations is fusing self-determination
and democratization through organization, supervision, verification, coordination, or other support of
elections.").

118. Versailles Treaty, supra note 20, pt. III Annex, para. 34.

The plebiscite, in turn,

prevented a potential territorial dispute from arising between France and Germany over the Saar. See
Wilde, From Danzig, supra note 7, at 589-90.
119. Wilde, From Danzig,supra note 7, at 591.
120. Id.
121. See RATNER, supra note 7, at 111. Today, there continues to exist an as yet unresolved selfdetermination claim for many of the local Papuan population, many of whom viewed the U.N.
involvement as more harmful than helpful. See Saltford, supra note 22, at 19-20.
122. STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 44, at 673.
123. See id.
124. See WILDE, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 48; The essential purpose of EUAM was to
solve both a sovereignty and a governance problem. The city of Mostar was contested between the new
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against Charter norms 25, and instances of a corresponding lack of meaningful
consent by local populations seemingly violate embedded principles of selfdetermination. In the end, many ITA projects suffer from the same imposed nature
that came to characterize colonial administration. This presents one area that the
emerging body ofjus post bellum needs to account for.
The U.S.- and U.K.-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq did
much to increase 10 legitimacy in this regard. From the beginning, the nowdefunct CPA was primarily regarded as a military occupation that existed without
international, host-state, or local consent, despite a mandate that was directed
126
Its
expressly at transitional administration and eventual self-governance.
upon
imposition
forced
its
and
States)
United
(the
association with a single state
127
the people of Iraq has given rise to strong associations with imperialism. While
the Security Council subsequently recognized both the United States and the
United Kingdom as the occupying powers in Iraq, the mere fact of ex post U.N.
28
approval did little to "internationalize" perceptions of the CPA.1 The example of
Iraq shows that in certain situations, the voice of fifteen nations could be preferable
to one state acting alone.
B. Accountability
The International Law Association (ILA)'s 2004 Report, Accountability of
International Organisations, states that accountability "is linked to the authority
and power of an 10. Power entails accountability; that is the duty to account for its
exercise. ' ' 12 9 International organizations have traditionally been seen as beholden
to their Member States, yet today, some have claimed that bodies such as the
3°
United Nations are acting independently with a will all their own. The ability of

state of Herzog-Bosna and Croatia, and EUAM's purpose was to overcome the city's ethnic divide
through physical reconstruction and social reunification. See Wilde, From Danzig,supra note 7, at 59394; SARAH REICHEL, WISSENSCHAFTSZENTRUM BERLIN FUR SOZIALFORSCHUNG, TRANSITIONAL
ADMINISTRATIONS IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: A REPETITION OF FAILURES OR A NECESSARY LEARNING
PROCESS TOWARDS A UNIVERSAL PEACE-BUILDING TOOL AFTER ETHNO-POLITICAL WAR? 4 (2000)

available at http://skylla.wz-berlin.de/pdf/2000/p00-305.pdf; The Memorandum of Understanding
creating EUAM gave the EU civil authority over the city, with the ultimate goal of self-sustaining and
multiethnic local governance. Memorandum of Understanding of the European Administration of
Mostar art. 2.
125. Christopher M. Tiso, Safe Haven Refugee Programs: A Method of Combating International
Refugee Crises, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 575, 576 (1994).

126. See, e.g., Ottolenghi, supra note 76, at 2201-2203; Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation
http://www.cpaavailable at
2003/01
May
CPA/REG/16
2,
para.
§1,
1
iraq.org/regulations/20030516 CPAREG IThe CoalitionProvisionalAuthority_.pdf (also giving
the CPA "all executive, legislative and judicial authority necessary to fulfill its objectives").
127. See, e.g., CoalitionLaws and Transition Arrangements During Occupation of Iraq, 98 AM. J.
INT'L L. 601,605 (2004) (Sean D. Murphy ed.).
128. S.C. Res. 1483, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003); Ottolenghi, supra note 76, at 217778 (2004) (noting that Jerry Bremer, the head of the CPA, was appointed by U.S. president George W.
Bush).
129. INT'L L. ASS'N, 2004 REPORT OF THE SEVENTY FIRST CONFERENCE ON THE ACCOUNTABILITY
OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 5 (2004) [hereinafter ILA Report].
130. See Klabbers, supra note 72, at 226.
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Member States to control "their" organization, the organization's commitment to
upholding international law, and the ability of a local population to have recourse
for potential abuses all factor heavily into an 10's legitimacy to perform territorial
administration. There are two primary components to the question of
accountability vis-A-vis ITA operations: the accountability that exists between the
1O and its Member States and that which exists between an ITA project and the
local population.
In response to claims that the Security Council acts beyond its legal authority
when authorizing ITA mandates,'13 Neils Blokker has stated, "When a member
feels that an organization is not acting as it should, or is not acting at all, it is likely
that sooner or later the member may accuse the organization of not being
'accountable."" ' 32 While the League of Nations remained relatively weak
and
inactive, the accountability of the United Nations has become a major focus of
reform proposals, including one put forth by the Working Group on the Equitable
Representation On and Increase In the Membership of the Security Council and
another in the December 2004 Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Change. 1 33 Significantly, there exist-no institutional limits on the
Security Council in the Charter. The General Assembly may make nonlegally
binding resolutions that are often reflective of international will, but it has no
ability to consider questions concerning international peace and security if they are
already being discussed by the Security Council. 34 In terms of Charter limitations,
however, the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) stated in
Tadi6:
The Security Council is an organ of an international organization,
established by a treaty which serves as a constitutional framework for
that organization. The Security Council is thus subjected to certain
constitutional limitations, however broad its powers under the
constitution may be. Those powers cannot, in any case, go beyond the
limits of the jurisdiction of the Organization at large, not to mention
other specific limitations. ..
One area of current debate is the relationship between the ICJ and the
Council, specifically whether or not the ICJ may review decisions of the Security
131. See discussion infra Part III.A.
132. Exploring the Evolution of Purposes, Methods and Legitimacy: Accountability of
IntergovernmentalOrganizations,94 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 204,205 (2000).
133. See U.N. General Assembly, Report of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of
Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other
Matters related to the Security Council, para. 7, annex IV paras. 57-8, U.N. Doc. A/58/47 (2004)
(suggesting improved transparency, higher participation of the nonpermanent members, and increasing
the relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly); See High-Level Panel
Report, supra note 67, annex I, para. 74-7 (presenting two separate proposals for a restructured Security
Council).
134. U.N. CHARTER arts. 10-12.

135. Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic a/k/a "Dule", Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence Motion
for
Interlocutory
Appeal
on
Jurisdiction,
para.
70
(Oct.
2,
1995),
http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/decision-e/51002.htm.
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Council. The Court itself has rejected the argument that Security Council
136
determinations made under Article 24 are the exclusive province of the Council.
In the Libya case, the Court held that Chapter VII resolutions prevail over other
legal obligations under Article 103 of the Charter but, in so holding, did not
address specifically whether or not there existed limits upon the Council's ability
to override the legal rights of states.' 37 Thus, accusations by the international
community that the Security Council is acting ultra vires when authorizing
complex ITA projects may or may not find recourse at the ICJ. The larger issue of
should exercise judicial review is a question beyond the
whether or not the ICJ
138
scope of this article.
At the second level of accountability, that which exists between the
organization's ITA mission and the local population, the discussion here will focus
upon the United Nations' legal accountability, with UNTAET and UNMIK
presenting compelling case studies. 1 39 The perpetration of human rights abuses by
U.N. officials as well as a lack of firm political controls over administrative
projects has given a renewed sense of urgency to the question of 10 accountability.
As set forth below, while the law in this area remains complex, its evolving nature
has shown 0a move toward increased responsibility for both peacekeeping and ITA
activities. 14
In terms of general legal accountability, the United Nations is afforded
privileges and immunities under Article 105 of the Charter and is endowed with
legal personality under the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of
the United Nations.' 4 1 In the Reparations Case, the ICJ notably implied that the
United Nations enjoys legal personality, not as a collection of individual legal
142
personalities of the its Member States but as a separate entity altogether; this
conclusion further implies a conferral of rights and duties upon the Organization as
136. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J.
392, 433 (Nov. 26, 1984).
137. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), 1992 I.C.J. 114, 126-27 (Apr. 14, 1992); see Thomas M.
Franck, The "Powers of Appreciation": Who is the Ultimate Guardian of UN Legality?, 86 AM. J.
INT'L L. 519, 521-22 (1992).
138. For a thorough discussion of ICJ review of Security Council decisions, see Jos& E. Alvarez,
Judging the Security Council, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. I(1996).
139. Whether or not the League enjoyed a distinct legal personality capable of assuming rights and
obligations is less clear than with the United Nations. For example, because the League operated by
consensus, there seemed to be no distinct body capable of acting independently of Member States who
did not agree with a particular course of action. However, the League appears to have taken on the
characteristics of a distinct actor in other respects, as seen in the enjoyment of privileges and
immunities by League officials and the inviolability of League property. See WiLDE, ADMINISTRATiON,
supra note 4, at 46-47.
140. See ILA Report, supra note 129, at 250-53.
141. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, art. 1, § 1, Feb. 13, 1946,
21 U.S.T. 1418, 1 U.N.T.S. 15; U.N. CHARTER art. 105; Article II of the 1946 Convention likewise
accords the United Nations "immunity from every form of legal process except insofar as in any
particular case it has expressly waived its immunity."
142. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949
I.C.J. 174, 178-80 (Apr. 11)[hereinafter ReparationsCase].
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a whole based upon the notion of functional necessity. 143 The idea of functional
necessity allows the United Nations to carry out the functions
implied in its
144
purpose, functions that often "mirror the functions of a State."'
Within the context of military force, the United Nations has recognized
certain principles of legal accountability, primarily through the SecretaryGeneral's Bulletin on the Observance by United Nations Forces of International
Humanitarian Law, which renewed the United Nations' commitment to
international responsibility for damage to life and property caused by the activities
of U.N. forces.145 It has also implemented a policy decision to establish third-party
liability, albeit with temporal and financial limitations, which, together with the
Bulletin, represents the framework of the United Nations' internal doctrine for
legal responsibility with respect to military actions. 146 Military members of
national forces, who are not covered under the 1946 Convention, are afforded
privileges and immunities in the various status of forces agreements (SOFAs)
entered into between the United Nations and that country, 147 and contributing
countries have adopted internal peacekeeping codes of conduct promulgated by the
U.N.'s Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 48 Under the model SOFA
adopted by the General Assembly and endorsed by the Security Council, military
49
personnel are subject to the criminal authority of the contributing nation.1
The legal standards that apply to territorial administration are, however, much
less clear and much more complex. 50 Under the 1946 Convention, U.N. personnel
143. WILDE, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 41; see also Elizabeth Abraham, Comment, The
Sins of the Savior: Holding the United Nations Accountable to InternationalHuman Rights Standards
for Executive OrderDetentions in its Mission in Kosovo, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1291, 1310 (2003).
144. Abraham, supra note 143, at 1311.
145. See Secretary-General's Bulletin on the Observance by United Nations Forces of
InternationalHumanitarianLaw, para. 1.1, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/1993/13 (Aug. 6, 1999), available at
http://www.un.org/peace/st-sgb_1999_1 3.pdf.
146. See, e.g., The Secretary-General, Financing of the United Nations Protection Force, the
United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia, the United Nations Preventive
Deployment Force and the United Nations Peace Forces Headquarters; and Administrative and
Budgetary Aspects of the Financing of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Financingof the
United Nations Peacekeeping Operation, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/51/389
(Sept. 20, 1996); see Daphna Shraga, UN Peacekeeping Operations: Applicability of International
Humanitarian Law and Responsibilityfor Operations-RelatedDamage, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 406, 406
(2000).
147. The Secretary-General, Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping
Operations in All of Their Aspects: A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation
and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, para. 19, delivered to the General Assembly,
U.N. Doc. A/59/710 (Mar. 24, 2005) [hereinafter Comprehensive Strategy].
148. Id.
149. It should be noted, however, that it has become the practice of the United Nations to fail to
obtain specific guarantees regarding the willingness of nations to exercise such jurisdiction. Id. at para.
78.
150. Id. at para. 14 ("A United Nations peacekeeping operation may have a civilian component, a
military component and a civilian component. The components are governed by different rules and
disciplinary procedures because they each have a distinct legal status. The 2003 Secretary-General
bulletin [promulgating detailed rules prohibiting sexual exploitation and abuse that are mandatory for
all United Nations staff] does not, of its own force, apply to all three categories. This is a serious
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are granted privileges and immunities for acts committed within their official
duties; 15 1 the aforementioned SOFAs provide that civilian staff members of U.N.
missions are deemed to be officials under the 1946 Convention.152 If an act is
within an individual's official duties, the Secretary-General has "the right and the
duty to waive the immunity of any official in any case where, in his opinion, the
immunity would impede the course of justice and can be waived without prejudice
to the interests of the United Nations."'' 53 The determination as to whether or not a
staff member was acting within his or her official duties is made by the SecretaryGeneral acting upon the advice of the U.N.'s Office of Legal Affairs., 54 Thus, a
functional approach to the issue of accountability is the practice of the
Organization.
In the context of ITA, however, because the United Nations makes no claim
to sovereignty over the territory it administers, two legal persons come into being:
the United Nations and the territorial unit that is part of a larger legal person, such
as a state. 155 This has given rise to the concept of functional duality, as enunciated
by the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina in a case involving a
decision made by the OHR to implement a new Law on the State Border
Service.' 56 The OHR was a sui generis international organization provided for in
the Dayton Peace Agreement responsible for carrying out the civil administration
of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) following the conflict in the Balkans throughout
the 1990s. 157 Under its elusive mandate, the High Representative has interpreted its
powers to include the passing of laws as well as the dismissing of elected officials
from office. 118The Court recognized the immunity of the High Representative with
respect to his ability to interpret his mandate yet also recognized that the acts
performed by the foreign authorities on behalf of a sovereign state were on a

shortcoming.").
151. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, supranote 141, arts. V §
18, VI § 22.
152. This is so because not all Member States have themselves acceded to the 1946 Conventions.
Comprehensive Strategy, supra note 147, annex para. A.2.
153. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, supra note 151, at arts. V
§ 20, VI § 23.
154. Comprehensive Strategy, supra note 147, annex para. A.3; In addition, a 2002 SecretaryGeneral bulletin entitled "Status, Basic Rights and Duties of United Nations Staff Members" requires
all staff to uphold the highest standards of integrity and act "in a manner befitting their status as
international civil servants..." The Secretary-General, Secretary-General's Bulletin: Status, Basic
Rights and Duties of United Nations Staff Members, ch. IV, art. I, reg. 1.2(0, U.N. Doc.
ST/SGB/2002/13 (Nov. 1, 2002); these are, significantly, merely guideposts rather than legally binding
rules. id. ch. 1,para. 7.
155. Ralph Wilde, The Complex Role of the Legal Adviser When International Organizations
Administer Territory, 95 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 251, 252 (2001) [hereinafter Wilde, Complex Role].
156. See Case U 09/00, Official Gazzette of Bosn. & Herz., paras. 13-14, (Nov. 3, 2000)
[hereinafter Case U 09/00].
157. The Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina: General Framework Agreement for Peace in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, annex 10, art. 1, delivered to the Security Council and General Assembly,
U.N. Doc. S/1995/999, A/50/79C (Dec. 14, 1995) [hereinafter Dayton Peace Accords].
158. Wilde, Complex Role, supra note 155, at 252-53. For a detailed discussion of the OHR and
its legal authority, see WILDE, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 63-77.
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different footing.159 For this reason, it found a situation of "functional duality: an
authority of one legal system intervenes in another legal system, thus making its
functions dual."' 6 ° In accordance with this principle, whereas those acts performed
with respect to the High Representative's role as an international actor were
immune from prosecution, those performed with respect to his role as an agent for
the territorial entity were not. 161
Under the United Nations' functional approach of accountability, ITA
projects simultaneously invoke the two separate legal regimes of the law
62
applicable to states and the law applicable to international organizations.
Therefore, when international organizations perform acts that are the acts of a
national government, "as agents of that state, the UN officials must comply with
the international legal norms applicable to it. Moreover, these norms, and the
norms applicable to international organizations,
are not just both in play-they are
'' 6 3
both in play with respect to the same acts.
Human rights violations by international officials have been particularly
problematic in both East Timor and Kosovo, and much literature exists cataloguing
examples of serious crimes committed by U.N. officials and the contingent
problems related to uncertain privileges and immunities. 64 One prominent
example has been the issuing of executive orders of detention by UNMIK, a
practice that has received widespread criticism as a clear violation of international
human rights standards but which has continued. 65 Other abuses have included
rape, trafficking in women, solicitation of prostitution,
and the destruction and
66
repossession of privately owned buildings and land. 1
Under this framework, the applicability of international human rights
standards to ITA officials must be examined with respect to whether an individual
is acting in his role as an international or as a governmental actor. 167 In the
context of human rights, some have criticized the functional approach, pointing out
that the existence of privileges and immunities for the United Nations without
reciprocal obligations under human rights law is inequitable and that, when

159. See Case U 09/00, supra note 156, para. 5.
160. Id.
161. See Wilde, Complex Role, supra note 155, at 255.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 256.
164. See, e.g., Frederick Rawski, To Waive or Not to Waive: Immunity and Accountability in U.N.
Peacekeeping Operations,18 CONN. J. INT'L L. 103, 118-24 (2002).
165. Id. at 121-22. In the case of Afrim Zeqiri, an ethnic Albanian arrested for murder, the
Ombudsperson in Kosovo required a legal clarification of the basis for his continued detention that had
been authorized under an executive order. The director of the Department for Judicial Affairs stated
that executive order detentions were lawful under a broad interpretation of Resolution 1244, which
permitted the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to ensure public safety and the
administration of justice. In the end, Zeqiri was released for a lack of evidence, but not before spending
two years in detention. Abraham, supra note 143, at 1328-29.
166. Id. at 121.
167. Wilde, Complex Role, supra note 155, at 255.
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conducting territorial administration, the United Nations-acting as a stateshould be expected to follow the same obligations of a state. 168 Succinctly put,
the question is increasingly put about the extent to which
international organizations,

qua international organizations,

are

bound by international human rights law.... [W]hat needs to be
considered is that the norms of international human rights law

applicable to states can also be in play when a governmental role is
69

performed.1

The ILA has supported this proposition by stating that an 10 is responsible for an
internationally wrongful act committed170by an organ of a state over which it
exercises authority and effective control.
In practice, the international aspects of an official's conduct - and the
resulting immunities - have tended to eclipse the local ones. In the 2005
Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, the United Nations itself addressed the
application of the 1946 Convention in civilian operations. According to the report:
In the great majority of cases the application of the tests in the
Convention is clear. What was not anticipated at the time the
General Convention was drafted was that the United Nations would,
on occasion, be operating in areas where there was no functioning
legal system or where the legal system was so devastated by conflict
that it no longer satisfied minimum international human rights
standards. In such cases it would not be in the interests of the United
Nations to waive immunity because its Charter requires it to uphold,
promote and respect human rights. In other words, it would not be in
the interest of the Organization for the Secretary-General to permit a
staff member to be subjected to a criminal process that did not respect
17

basic international human rights standards.

Because of this approach, in many cases the full extent of an international actor's
accountability has gone unrecognized.
In addition to the uncertain legal framework, Ombudsperson officers
established in East Timor and Kosovo were largely ineffective in providing
recourse to the local populations due to various constraints on their authority and a

168. Abraham, supra note 143, at 1304-05; The ILA's 2004 Report lists the ways in which human
rights law can become binding on international organizations: through the terms of their constituent
instruments, as customary international law, or through general principles of public international law.
The Report explicitly states that "10-s should incorporate basic human rights obligations into their
operational guidelines, policies and procedures, particularly when exercising governmental authority in
the conduct of temporary administration of a territory." ILA Report, supra note 129, at 22-23.
169. Wilde, Complex Role, supra note 155, at 255-56. A separate question that I do not address
here is under what circumstances and the extent to which principles of international humanitarian law
should apply to ITA. See Ratner, supra note 11,
at 705-12.
170. ILA Report, supra note 129, at 28.
171. Comprehensive Strategy, supra note 148, at para. 88.
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lack of material support.'72 Officials working within UNTAET's Human Rights
Unit reported feeling hampered by their belief that international human rights
norms were not binding upon the mission or its personnel. 173 Moreover, because
international officials rather than contingents of a multinational peacekeeping force
or the ones involved in the abuses, there is no obligation upon a contributing nation
to exercise any form of domestic jurisdiction. Therefore, in combination with the
uncertain legal framework is a lack of effective enforcement mechanisms.
One reason cited for such abuses is the lack of adequate structural checks,
including those posed by an independent judicial body, upon the powers of both
the Transitional Administrator (TA) in East Timor and the SRSG in Kosovo. In
East Timor, the TA was given full legislative, executive, and judicial authority
over the territory 174 and had the sole authority to appoint local representatives to
successive phases of East Timorese self-governance, from the National
Consultative Council to the National Council, the Council of Ministers, and the
Second Transitional Government. 75 The overall lack of separation of powers and
the final voice of the TA in all administrative matters created a confusing picture
that ultimately meant the U.N. officials were not subject to the same sorts of
political pressures that would, in a democratic society, have made them more
accountable to the local population.176 In Kosovo, a similar conflation of legislative
and executive power in the SRSG has also raised concerns of undue influence over
judicial affairs and a lack of checks and balances. 177 For example, Regulation
1999/1 gives the SRSG all legislative and executive authority, administration over
the judiciary, and the power to appoint or remove any person in the civil
administration in Kosovo. 1 78 This in part allowed the SRSG in Kosovo to
promulgate Regulation 2000/47, giving absolute immunity to all personnel

172. Rawski, supranote 164, at 116; Abraham, supra note 143, at 1325.
173. Carla Bongiorno, A Culture of Impunity: Applying International Human Rights Law to the
UnitedNations in East Timor, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 623,652 (2002).
174. U.N. Transitional Admin. in East Timor [UNTAET], Regulation No. 1999/1 on the Authority
of the TransitionalAdministrator in East Timor, §§ 1.1, 1.2, UNTAET/REG/1999/1, (Nov. 27, 1999)
(preparedby Sergio Vieira de Mello).
175. U.N. Transitional Admin. in East Timor [UNTAET], Regulation No. 2000/24 on the
Establishment of a National Council, §§ 1.1, 1.2, UNTAET/REG/2000/24 (July 14, 2000) (preparedby
Sergio Vieira de Mello); U.N. Transitional Admin. in East Timor [UNTAET], Regulation No. 2001/2
on the Election of a Constituent Assembly to Prepare a Constitution for an Independent and
DemocraticEast Timor, §§ 1.1, 2.1, UNTAET/REG/2001/2 (Mar. 16, 2001) (preparedby Sergio Vieira
de Mello); U.N. Transitional Admin. in East Timor [UNTAET], Regulation No. 2001/28 on the
Establishment of the Council of Ministers, §§l, 3.1, UNTAET/REG/2001/28 (Sept. 19, 2001) (prepared
by Sergio Vieira de Mello); U.N. Transitional Admin. in East Timor [UNTAET] Regulation No. 2002/7
on the Organic Structure of the Second Transitional Government of East Timor and to Amend
UNTAET Regulation No. 2001/28, §§ 1.1-1.5, UNTAET/REG/2002/07 (May 18, 2002) (preparedby
Sergio Vieira de Mello).
176. Beauvais, supra note 9, at 1169.
177. See U.N. Mission in Kosovo, Regulation No. 1999/1 on the Authority of the Interim
Administration in Kosovo, § 1.1 (July 25, 1999) (preparedby Dr. Bernard Kouchner); David Marshall
& Shelley Inglis, Human Rights in Transition: The Disempowerment of Human Rights--Based Justice
in the UnitedNations Mission in Kosovo, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 95, 114 (2003).
178. Regulation No. 1999/1, supra note 174, § 1.2.
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Hans Corell, the former Legal Counsel for the United Nations, once stated
that the relationship between the U.N. Secretariat and the Special Representative in
8
East Timor provided adequate checks and balances on any abuses of power."
However, this type of oversight is not readily visible to the local population and
runs the risk of being constrained by other unrelated political factors within the
United Nations.181 In addition, the lack of personnel at the Secretariat "makes it
1 82
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Nations
law themselves, and especially to respect the rights of the people whom it is their
mission to help." 184 In the same report, Annan also announced his enactment of a
policy of "'zero tolerance"' for offenses committed by "all personnel engaged in
United Nations operations" without differentiating between military and civilian
operations.'"
Overall, the patchwork applicability of privileges and immunities to U.N.
officials has left large lacunae in ITA legal, and political, accountability. Rawski
correctly points out that these missions are fundamentally different from
peacekeeping operations and that, for this reason, "[s]tatements by UNTAET and
UNMIK personnel about immunity expose an unwillingness or inability to
recognize that transitional administration brings with it a different set of legal,
86
political and ethical realities. 1 Moreover, he observes that the source of much of
the problems concerning legal accountability for ITA missions has been the fact
that the "application of the Convention has been inconsistent and UN rhetoric has
been confused"' 18 7 This lack of enforceable and cognizable limits upon the United
Nations' actions in Kosovo and East Timor has helped foster damaging
perceptions that international organizations are somehow above the law,
perceptions reinforced by the fact that cases in which U.N. officials had been
179. U.N. Mission in Kosovo, Regulation 2000/47 on the Status, Privileges and Immunities of
KFOR and UNMIK and Their Personnel in Kosovo, §§ 2, 3.2, UNMIK/REG/2000/47 (Nov. 18, 2000)
(preparedby Dr. Bernard Kouchner); The Regulation also granted the operation complete immunity
from suits arising out of operational necessity. Id. § 7; The Ombudsperson in Kosovo released a report
that was highly critical of Regulation 2000/47. Rawski, supra note 164, at 122.
180. See Kreilkamp, supra note 8, at 669-70.
181. Id. at 670.
182. Ratner, supra note 11, at 715.
183. Rawski, supranote 164. at 121.
184. In Larger Freedom, supranote 63, para. 113.
185. Id.
186. Rawski, supra note 164, at 126.
187. Id. at 123.
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suspected of committing criminal offenses (for example, East Timor) have not
been brought to trial. 188 Significantly, the 2005 Comprehensive Strategy to
Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations peacekeeping
operations recognizes the differing legal standards that currently apply to military
189
and civilian components of U.N. missions and the problems that this has created.
Such reports represent at a minimum a growing self-consciousness on behalf of the
United Nations that it cannot persist in taking an ad hoc approach to the question
of accountability in the context of ITA.
C. Reputation
1. Selflessness
Largely because the League of Nations and the United Nations were founded
upon the premise of collective security, there is an inherent notion of global
cooperation in their constitutions that removes the focus from individual states and
places it onto the international community as a whole. This lends itself to the idea
that when an 10 administers territory, it is acting not out of its own self-interest,
but rather for the greater good - creating, in other words, a "benevolent foreign
autocracy."' 90 However, the U.N. Charter also reflects a political balance between
the major powers of the world, giving them what some would argue to be a
disproportionately larger role in the organization's decision making.' 9' If an
international organization is seen as merely a front for powerful states' agendas,
then despite global membership, Lyons' fear of the strong overpowering the weak
becomes more pronounced. 92 Encouragingly, the U.N. has recently taken more
concrete, forward-moving steps toward complete institutional reform as presented
in the December 2004 Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change. 193 Secretary-General Annan has himself pushed forward several dramatic
recommendations in his 2005 In Larger Freedom report, and the General
Assembly responded94with a Draft Outcome document directed at widespread
institutional change.'

188. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, East Timor: Justice Past, Present and Future, § 5.4, A.I. Doc.

ASA/57/001/2001 (2001); See also Carla Bongiorno, supra note 173, at 692 (noting that "the U.N. has
obligations under international human rights law, that the U.N. has not formally acknowledged, when
its peacekeeping operations undertake governmental functions").
189. Comprehensive Strategy, supra note 147, at § 2, para. 14.
190. Chesterman, supra note 64, at 1.
191. See Obiora Chinedu Okafor, The Global Processof Legitimation and the Legitimacy of Global
Governance, 14 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 117, 129-30 (1997); See also Peter Vale, Engaging the
World's Marginalizedand Promoting Global Change: Challengesfor the United Nations at Fifty, 36
HARV. INT'L L.J. 283, 284 (1995) ("In its present configuration, the U.N. means little to those outside
the mainstream--those excluded from global society as a result of its existing discriminatory
structure.").
192. See generally Lyons, supra note 78.
193. See High-Level Panel Report, supra note 67, at 1,4-5 (addressing security concerns, their
causes, and how the United Nations can be more effective in the twenty-first century).
194. See In Larger Freedom, supra note 63, at 2. See also, G.A. Res. 60/1, U.N. Doc. A/Res/60/l
(Sept. 16, 2005).
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As seen in Part III.A, Security Council critiques most often reflect the
perceptions that (1) it is dominated by a few powerful states and (2) the veto is
unfair. 195 Jos& Alvarez has observed that the United Nations is largely based on a
statist ideal, making it an "'undemocratic' hierarchical scheme dependent upon the
hegemonic power of a handful of powerful states.' 9 6 A former Japanese U.N.
ambassador once remarked that four of the five permanent members are from
Europe and America, but that today, "[t]here are other civilizations in other parts
of the world whose peoples are now more assertive than before."' 97 From this
perspective, the idea of legitimation by collective action in the Security Council
may merely serve to mask the motives of individual states pursuing their own
prerogatives.' 98 Echoing these concerns, Jan Klabbers has stated that perhaps
"international organizations have in the end fallen victim to their own success ....
[P]erhaps partly because the idea of their inherent goodness held199sway for such a
long time, they may have succumbed to the arrogance of power."
In the last decade, much focus has been placed on the concept of humanitarian
intervention as a form of "enlightened" self-interest, whereby the reasons for
2 °°
intervention are claimed to be so compelling as to make the means legitimate.
Nevertheless, humanitarian intervention continues to be attacked for resting upon
20
dubious legal grounds and for being selectively employed around the world. ' The
hurdles posed by Articles 2(4) and 2(7) have led to stretched justifications for
humanitarian intervention that have been criticized as putting the protection of
human rights above the Charter-endorsed principle of state sovereignty. 20 2 This has
been said to create a situation whereby "what is illegitimate unilaterally may be

195. Caron, supra note 69, at 562; see also Coicaud, supra note 68, at 272 (arguing that the flawed
decision making of the Security Council is one of the principle reasons for what he argues to be the
organization's overall (as opposed to ITA-specific) demise in legitimacy.).
196. Jos6 E. Alvarez, Constitutional Interpretation in International Organizations, in THE
LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 104, 108 (Jean-Marc Coicaud & Veijo Heiskanen
eds., 2001).
197. Chusei Yamada, The United Nations at its Turning Point: A Japanese Perception, in THE
UNITED NATIONS AT AGE FIFTY: A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 185, 191 (Christian Tomuschat ed., 1995);
Yamada goes on to note that the lack of faith in the Security Council is due to a perception that "the
permanent members only make use when such action suits them." Id.
198. Caron, supra note 69, at 558 (listing five side effects that a perception of illegitimacy may
have on the effectiveness of the Security Council: (1)failure to pass a resolution due to a suspicion of
where it will lead, (2) refusal to adopt a strong resolution, (3) difficulty for a state to build domestic
support necessary to act under a resolution, (4) slow movement on the part of states in complying with a
resolution, and (5) actions and strategies that either intentionally or accidentally weaken the Council);
see also David D. Caron, Strengthening the Collective Authority of the Security Council, 87 AM. SOC'Y
INT'L L. PROC. 300, 305 (1993).
199. Klabbers, supra note 72, at 245.
200. See Richard Falk, The Complexities of HumanitarianIntervention: A New World Order
Challenge, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 491,492 (1996).
201. See Christine Chinkin, NATO's Kosovo Intervention: Kosovo: A "Good" or "Bad" War?, 93
AM. J. INT'L L. 841, 846-47 (1999).

202. See Louis Henkin, NA TO's Kosovo Intervention: Kosovo and the Law of "Humanitarian
Intervention, "93 AM. J. INT'L L. 824, 824-25 (1999).
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legitimate if it is the subject of a collective decision of the United Nations. 2 °3
Thus, the fact that the Kosovo bombing, which ultimately led to administration of
the region by UNMIK, did not receive Security Council authorization due to the
threat of a veto posed by Russia and China has prompted many to examine the
underlying legality of the NATO bombing, despite the imperative for
intervention.2 °4 This situation (a needed response thwarted by political
motivations) has been extended2 to
implicate the United Nations' ability as a whole
5
to effectively provide security. 0
Notably, the OHR was created to administer the BiH precisely because of
U.N. failure in the region and its discredited reputation for protecting the
population.20 6 One problem with the pursuit of selfless goals could be that the
United Nations is poorly constructed to effectively pursue those goals on a
consistent basis due to inherent political factors and technocratic limitations.20 7 In
the words of the 2004 High-Level Panel Report, "[the Security Council] has not
always been equitable in its actions, nor has it acted consistently or effectively 20in8
face of genocide or other atrocities. This has gravely damaged its credibility.

Therefore, irrespective of whether or not IOs are seen as over-acting (i.e., ultra
vires criticisms) or under-acting (failing to prevent mass human rights atrocities),
claims of illegitimacy may arise.
The inability of the U.N. to act in a truly selfless way finds further support in
the claim that humanitarian intervention continues to reflect the interests of
individual states, a claim that takes two sides. On the one hand, commentators
point to the fact that less developed states express strong opposition to
humanitarian intervention and continue to rely on state sovereignty as an
unassailable and permanently overriding principle.2 °9 On the other hand are those
who claim that the West uses humanitarian intervention to promote its own
specific vision of world order, something Christine Chinkin has forcefully argued
elsewhere.210

203. Ralph Zacklin, Beyond Kosovo: The United Nations andHumanitarianIntervention, 41 VA. J.
INT'L L. 923,932 (2001).
204. Henkin, supra note 202, at 825-27.

205. Id at 827 (noting that "as Kosovo illustrated, the Council, as presently constituted and under
prevailing procedures, remains seriously defective and may sometimes be unavailable for that awesome
responsibility").
206. WILDE, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 63-64.

207. The 2000 Brahimi Report gives a discussion of technocratic limitations, which are beyond the
scope of this article. ReporLof the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations,para. 77, U.N. Doc.
S/2000/809, A/55/305 (Aug. 21, 2000) available at http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace-operations
[hereinafter Brahimi Report].
208. High-Level Panel Report, supra note 67, para. 246.
209. See Zacklin, supra note 203, at 935.
210. Chinkin, supra note 201, at 846 (stating "the Kosovo intervention shows that the West
continues to script international law, even while it ignores the constitutional safeguards of the
international legal order. The instances since 1990 that are most frequently cited as evidence that
humanitarian intervention is evolving as a doctrine of post-Charter international law were initiated by
the West and involved action in non-Western states . . . .The alleged doctrine seems to exemplify
international lawmaking by the West for its own application, in the name of its "civilizing" mission").
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Aside and apart from perceptions that the United Nations only serves to
promote Western action, the mandates for many ITA missions have themselves
been seen as strongly promoting Western ideals.21 1 The 'standards before status'
approach toward the administration of Kosovo is reflective of this. Under
Resolution 1244, Kosovo is to enjoy substantial autonomy within the FRY; part of
ensuring the region's right to substantial autonomy is, therefore, putting into place
local actors supportive of this outcome.212 In order to achieve this goal, the same
Resolution gives UNMIK the power to secure the population's international human
rights by helping to install a democratic form of liberal government that is
21 3
instrumental in promoting and protecting these rights. UNMIK is one example
where ITA has been used, not only to fill a power vacuum, but instead to "engineer
a fundamental change in government policy" that is largely in line with prevailing
Western thought.2 14
In Kosovo and East Timor, the basis for the United Nations' continued
presence has been the Organization's insistence that the local populations are (or in
215
The
East Timor, were) unable to perform administration themselves.
aforementioned problems with Security Council decision making and the use of
the veto power have the ability to turn even ostensibly "selfless" missions into
perceived self-interested ones. While the United Nations' initial goals of protecting
international human rights and enabling self-determination claims are in the
interest of the common good,216 its prolonged presence in certain cases seems
suspiciously paternalistic and based largely upon Western ideals of what
constitutes good governance. Importantly, the promotion of liberal democratic
217
principles does not find universal support in all nations of the world. However,
UNMIK and UNTAET must also be examined alongside the CPA, which was
strongly associated with the national security and economic interests of the United
States as a result of the war in Iraq and, as such, was largely discredited from its
Nevertheless, David Rieff remarks that "it may prove impossible to intervene in the world's gravest
crises without arousing fears of imperial agendas." David Rieff, A Nation of Pre-emptors?, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 15, 2006, at Magazine 12.
211. Wilde identifies a variety of policy objectives of ITA projects, the most relevant here being the
promotion of the institution of the state (i.e., "state building") and the imposition of liberal governance
and a market economy. WILDE, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 203-207. Other objectives include
the promotion of territorial status and self-determination outcomes and the exploitation of natural
resources. Id. at 199, 208.
212. S.C. Res. 1244, para. 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999); see Paul R. Williams,
EarnedSovereignty: The Road to Resolving the Conflict over Kosovo's Final Status, 31 DENV. J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 387,409-10 (2003).
213. WILDE, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 206.
214. Wilde, Critique, supranote 5, at 85.
215. WILDE, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 186.
216. This assumes that the initial purposes of the administration were not pleaded in bad faith to
cover up more objectionable aims. See id. at 12.
217. See Bilhari Kausikan, Asia's Different Standard, FOREIGN POL'Y, FALL 1993 (accusing the
West of hypocrisy, and stating that "the hard core of rights that are truly universal is smaller than many
in the West are wont to pretend." Continuing, Kausikan argues that some Asian nations do not seek
"democracy"-a value-laden term for him-but instead seek "good government" that is effective and
efficient and able to secure basic needs.) Id. at 34, 37-38.
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inception. The experience of the CPA shows that foreign territorial administration
not conducted by 1Os still has the potential to prove equally problematic with
respect to perceptions of selflessness.,
2. Impartiality
Whereas the previous discussion of selflessness analyzed the potential for
self-interest leading up to a decision to intervene, here the discussion of
impartiality looks at the role 1Os play after intervention has already occurred. The
vision of U.N. impartiality rests on the same principles of multinationality as the
vision of U.N. selflessness described above. The Charter endorses impartiality in
Article 100, which states that the staff of the Secretariat "shall not seek or receive
instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the
Organization. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their
position as international officials responsible only to the Organization. 2 18
According to the ILA, "[a]n 10 should conduct its institutional and
operational activities in a manner which is objective and impartial and can be seen
to be so. ' '21 9 Impartiality, like host state consent, has always been a cornerstone of
peacekeeping operations. 220 The very first peacekeeping missions mandated that
military observers be absolutely impartial at all times and serve as a buffer zone
between two sides to a conflict, and the 2000 report from the Panel on United
Nations Peace Operations reaffirmed the Organization's commitment to this soAn assumption exists that international
called "bedrock principle.",221
organizations are better suited for providing this type of impartiality than an
independent state would be. However, this assumption is made largely in the
context of pure peacekeeping and observer missions rather than ITA.222 Despite the
differences between peacekeeping and-ITA, the same presumption of impartiality
continues to apply to ITA and, particularly, to ITA missions aimed at solving
sovereignty problems.
The ability of an international organization to defuse a potentially divisive
sovereignty problem by serving as a buffer was the primary reason for the
League's administration in the Saar and Leticia and the U.N.'s administration of
West Irian.223 When placed between two opposing sides, the ability to remain
impartial is relatively easy. As Jane Boulden has remarked, "[s]uch mandates are
impartial, because all that they do is commit the UN to overseeing terms or
arrangements already agreed to by the parties. 224 It is when the international

218. UN Charter art. 100.
219. ILA Report, supra note 129, at 14.
220. RATNER, supra note 7, at 51.
221. Brahimi Report, supra note 207, para. 48; see also Urquhart Interview, supra note 30 (Ralphe
Bunche said that: "[b]eing popular is not the point, being fair is the point").
222. DIEHL, supranote 7, at 64.
223. Jane Boulden, Mandates Matter: An Exploration of Impartiality in United Nations
Organizations, 11 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 147 (2005).
224. Id. at 151.
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organization is actively involved in local governance, however, that maintaining
true impartiality has posed a more difficult task.225
With respect to governance problems, ITA actors tend to take on a larger role
that is more intermixed with local populations and local institutions.226 The U.N.'s
experience in Somalia is particularly illustrative of this because the reconciliation
and rebuilding of the country was performed by the same forces that were
exercising military control over it. 227 In identifying General Aidid as a war
criminal and general hindrance to the peace process, the U.N. itself became
another party to the conflict, a situation that eventually led to the collapse of
UNOSOM 11.221 In Kosovo, the U.N. has repeatedly made substantive decisions
regarding the appointment of individuals to the civil administration and has
exercised the power to remove elected people from posts in pursuit of the goals set
forth in Resolution 1244.229 Similarly in Cambodia and East Timor, the U.N. was
placed in a position to further certain policy agendas by retaining ultimate control
230
over local governance during its time in administration.
Another important aspect of 10 impartiality is the aforementioned dual role
that international officials play when serving an ITA mission."' Although
functional duality was previously examined in the context of accountability, the
fact that international actors will be playing a direct role in local governance
proves the point that there will be times when such actors can definitively not be
neutral.232 Because governments are, by their very nature, biased toward the best
interests of the state, international actors are forced to promote individual state
interests when, as in Kosovo and East Timor, an international organization is
playing the very role of that government.233 One example of this was seen in the
negotiations over joint exploration between East Timor and Australia of oil and gas
resources in the zone known as the Timor Gap.234 UNTAET was actively engaged
in trying to gain the best deal for East Timor, a position that runs contrary to its
role as an international organization designed to represent the interests of all states
equally. 235 As Wilde points out, "officials cannot possibly combine these two
contradictory roles. They
cannot treat all states equally and advocate on behalf of
' 236
one state in particular.

225. See Urquhart Interview, supra note 30.
226. See discussion supra Part 1I.
227. Kreilkamp, supra note 8, at 636.
228. ld.at 637-38.
229. Regulation No. 1999/1, supra note 174, § 1.2.
230. See Kreilkamp, supra note 8, at 631-32, 655.
231. See discussion supra Part III.B.
232. Wilde, Complex Role, supra note 155, at 257.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 257-258; Tania Voon, Closing the Gap Between Legitimacy and Legality of
HumanitarianIntervention:Lessons from East Timor and Kosovo, 7 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF.
31,53-54 (2002).
235. Wilde, Complex Role, supra note 155, at 257-58.
236. Id. at 258.
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Winrich Khfine argues that the U.N. Charter itself and Security Council
mandates are neither impartial nor passive. 7 Consequently, he believes that when
the U.N. undertakes to execute a mandate, it is not necessarily equivalent to
"taking sides" but that instead, a fine line exists between fulfilling a mandate in
evenhanded way and avoiding the so-called "Mogadishu line" of Somalia. 38 But
this argument becomes less plausible the further a mandate moves away from
peacekeeping and the closer it moves toward ITA. While 10 impartiality worked
well in the Saar, Leticia, and West Irian, these operations were all instances of
partial administration and involved no direct governance by the 10. As seen in the
Congo, Somalia, UNMIK and UNTAET, invasive exercises of plenary
administration carry a strong potential to negate an international organization's
reputation as a neutral, impartial, or evenhanded actor.239
V. CONCLUSION

Attacks against U.N. peacekeepers in the C6te d'Ivoire show the extent to
which local populations can fail to distinguish an international presence from a
colonial one. 240 By looking at 10 legitimacy through the lenses of legal authority,
accountability, selflessness, and impartiality, it becomes clear that there are good
reasons for doubting assumptions that international organizations are inherently
more suited for territorial administration than states. The United Nations' more
recent "light footprint" approach to Afghanistan could present a picture of future
U.N. ITA projects.241

This contrasts with the intrusiveness that has come to be

associated with the missions in Kosovo and East Timor, not to mention those
conducted by other international actors (e.g., the OHR).
Overall, legitimacy on behalf of international organizations cannot be
assumed. But the question that remains is whether international organizations, and
particularly the United Nations, are perhaps the least illegitimate of all outside
actors.242 It may be the case that international administration will never be fully
legitimate or supportable on a normative level due to the tensions that are inherent
in using outside rule to bring about internal change.Yet proceeding from the
presumption that these types of activities will continue in the future, as evidenced
by the recent establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission within the U.N.,
237. Winrich Kuibne, The United Nations, Fragmenting States, and the Need for Enlarged
Peacekeeping, in THE UNITED NATIONS AT AGE FIFTY: A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 91, 101 (Christian

Tomuschat ed., 1995).
238. See id. at 102.
239. Describing the United Nation's dilemma in the Congo during the 1960's, Jane Boulden
remarked, "[d]eployed in a country in the midst of civil war, now without a government, every move
the UN made inevitably, if advertently, favored one group or the other .... [Elach decision the UN
took (especially the determination not to accept the secession or Katanga, albeit in pursuit of the need to
restore law and order and to prevent civil war as the mandate directed, had an impact on one or more of
the parties struggling for control." Boulden, supra note 223, at 153. She describes UNOSOM II in
similar terms. Id. at 154.
240. Polgreen, supra note 13.
241. U.N. Doc. S/2002/278, para. 98(d) (2002).
242. David Harland, Legitimacy and Effectiveness in International Administration, 10 GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 15, 17 (2004).
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mandates must now be constructed in a way that takes into account a more diverse
range of actors and interests.243 Despite all of its other faults, UNMIK has done
precisely this by incorporating different bodies with specialized competencies into
its mandate. Specifically, the OSCE has assumed responsibility for promoting
democratization and institution-building, the UNHCR has led a humanitarian
reconstruction component that devises
component, and the EU has developed a 244
economic and social policies for the region.
The establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission is itself progress. The
stated purpose of the Commission, as set forth in the General Assembly's
September 2005 Draft Outcome Document from the Millennium Summit, will be
"to bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and
propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery." 245
Included in this is the goal that the Commission "should provide recommendations
and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and
outside the United Nations....246 The Draft Outcome Document also provides for
an Organizational Committee that will consists of representatives from the country
under consideration; countries in the affected region; and the major financial,
troop, and civilian police-donating countries. 24 7 In December 2005, a draft
resolution was circulated in an effort to implement these suggestions, 24 and as of
this writing progress continues to be made in this direction.
The UNMIK model could continue to be usefully deployed in other situations
to ensure that some of the problems discussed above, such as a lack of local
involvement and problems with impartiality, might be eliminated. 249 And the goals
of the Peacebuilding Commission certainly go far in adding more voices to the
decision-making chorus. However in other areas, such as legal authority and
accountability, the law has not yet caught up to the situation on the ground with
respect to ITA.
As Ruth Gordon has stated, "to rebuild 'failed states,' perhaps we should start
at the bottom rather than the top by focusing on the peoples themselves, without
preconceived ideas of the answers or the solutions., 250 At a minimum, by

243. On the contrary, some believe that in the future the United Nations' activities will be far more
constrained. Edward Luck has stated, "'In the late '90s and the beginning of this century, it got overly
zealous in building norms, setting international law and trying to regulate state behavior. Now they
have to step back in an attempt to do both."' Warren Hoge, U.N. is Transforming Itself but Into What
is Unclear, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2005, at A3.
244. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in
Kosovo, U.N. Doc. S/1999/779, paras. 79-109 (1999).
245. World Summit Outcome, supra note 194, at paras. 97, 98.
246. Id.
247. Id. at para. 100.
248. U.N. Doc. A/60/L.40.
249. Proposals have also been made to revitalize the Trusteeship Council to oversee ITA projects.
Saira Mohamed, Note, From Keeping Peace to Building Peace: A Proposalfor a Revitalized United
Nations Trusteeship Council, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (2005). An additional, unexplored idea is to
take the lessons learned from ITA and use them to improve state administration.
250. Gordon, supra note 35, at 973.
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recognizing and acknowledging the gaps in 1O legitimacy to undertake such
projects, steps can now be made to improve upon existing weaknesses. In keeping
with Gordon's philosophy, international organizations should now begin aiming
for a new form of ITA that serves equally both the international and local
communities.

